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RECENT CASES
PRODUCTS LIABILITY-DEFECTIVENESS STANDARD OF SECTION
402A OF RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS QUESTIONED.
Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., - Pa. -, 337 A.2d 893
(1975).
The decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Berkebile
v. Brantly Helicopter Corp.,' in which Chief Justice Jones undertook
to clarify Pennsylvania products liability law,2 has engendered wide-
spread confusion about the nature of a defect that will make a seller
liable for injuries caused by his product. The first opinion to ad-
dress Berkebile, Beron v. Kramer-Trenton Co.,' arose in the federal
district court for eastern Pennsylvania. In it Judge Huyett argued
that Berkebile "threatens . . . to disrupt the orderly administration
of justice in this litigation-prone area of the law."4  The source of
the confusion lies in Berkebile's apparent rejection of the "unreason-
ably dangerous" standard of section 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts.5 The uncertainty is further heightened in that, al-
l. - Pa. -, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).
2. The opinion instructed that the plaintiff in a strict liability case must estab-
lish two basic elements to sustain his burden of proof-first, that the product
was defective and that the defect existed at the time the product left the seller's
hands and, second, that the defect was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
Id. at -, 337 A.2d at 898. In addition to its discussion of the meaning of the term
"defective," which is the focal point of this note, the Berkebile opinion held that the
trial court committed reversible error in its charge to the jury on the issue of "abnor-
mal use" of the product. Chief Justice Jones also instructed that "foreseeability is
not a test of proximate cause" and "whether [a seller] could have foreseen a particu-
lar injury is irrelevant in a strict liability case." Id. at -, 337 A.2d at 900. The
opinion reaffirms that contributory negligence is not a defense in a strict liability
action and that the plaintiff is precluded from recovery by the assumption of risk
defense "only if he knows of the specific defect eventually causing his injury and
voluntarily proceeds to use the product with knowledge of the danger caused by the
defect." Id. at -, 337 A.2d at 901.
3. 402 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-2407, 3d Cir.,
Dec. 17, 1975.
4. Id. at 1269.
5. Section 402A, Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to
User or Consumer, provides in part,
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused . . . if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product; and
though the entire court concurred in the result, only Justice Nix
added his signature to the Chief Justice's opinion.
Section 402A predicates a seller's liability upon a finding that
a product is "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer."6  Berkebile contended that the "unreasonably
dangerous" terminology of section 402A injects negligence concepts
into the law of strict liability and burdens "the injured plaintiff with
proof of an element which rings of negligence."7  As Chief Justice
Jones noted, the reason for adoption of strict liability in Webb v.
Zern8 was a desire to place responsibility upon the seller' for in-
juries caused by defects in his products. 10 The seller, by engaging
in business, "may be said to have 'undertaken and assumed a special
responsibility' toward the consuming public" and is "in a position to
spread the risk of defective products."" Prior to Webb the increas-
ing complexity of manufacturing and distributional processes placed
upon the plaintiff a nearly impossible burden of proving negligence
to recover for injuries sustained in the use or consumption of a prod-
uct. "The crucial difference between strict liability and negligence is
that the existence of due care, whether on the part of seller or con-
sumer, is irrelevant."' 2 The seller is responsible for injuries caused
by his defective product even if he "has exercised all possible care in
[its] preparation and sale . . . ."' Thus, the seller is "effectively
the guarantor of his product's safety."' 4 His liability is not, however,
the absolute liability of an insurer.'" Liability hinges on the existence
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product ...
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
cited as RESTATEMENT].
6. Id. § 402A(1) (emphasis added).
7. - Pa. at -, 337 A.2d at 899, quoting Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8
Cal. 3d 121, 132-33, 501 P.2d 1153, 1161, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 441 (1972).
8. 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966). In Webb the supreme court adopted
§ 402A in toto.
9. The term "seller" is used generically to include all those who are engaged
in the business of selling or supplying a product. - Pa. at -, 337 A.2d at 899.
10. Id. at -, 337 A.2d at 898.
11. Id. at - n.3, 337 A.2d at 898 n.3, citing RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment
c at 349.
12. Id. at -, 337 A.2d at 899.
13. RESTATEMENT § 402A(2) (a).
14. - Pa. at -, 337 A.2d at 900.
15. "Strict liability for products is clearly not that of an insurer. If it were,
a plaintiff would need only to prove that the product was a factual cause in producing
his injury." Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J.
825, 826 (1973) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Wade]. The commentary
to § 402A makes it clear that the seller is not liable for injuries caused by inher-
ently dangerous products, such as whiskey, that can cause harm despite perfection
(comment i) or for those caused by unavoidably unsafe products (comment k). RE-
STATEMENT § 402A, comment i at 352-53, comment k at 353-54.
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of a defect that makes the product unsafe for its intended use. Deter-
mination of whether a product is unsafe for its intended use or, in
other words, defective necessitates a societal value judgment. The
section 402A "unreasonably dangerous" standard attempts to formu-
late society's expectations of product safety in a manner that will al-
low the jury to determine objectively the seller's liability for product-
related injuries.
An injured plaintiff seeking recovery pursuant to section 402A,
however, must not be forced to bear the increased burden of proving
a seller's negligent conduct because of the jury's misunderstanding
of strict liability concepts. In any products liability case, therefore,
a proper balance between the competing interests of the seller and
consumer must be maintained. Chief Justice Jones viewed section
402A as creating a tilt toward the seller by requiring the consumer
to prove an element that "rings of negligence."
Berkebile recognized that the "salutary purpose of the 'unrea-
sonably dangerous' qualification [of section 402A] is to preclude
the seller's liability where it cannot be said that the product is defec-
tive ... "16 The Chief Justice considered the beneficial effect
outweighed, however, by the risk of undermining "the policy consid-
erations that have led us to hold in Salvador 7 that the manufacturer
is effectively the guaranter [sic] of his product's safety."' s  His pri-
mary objection was not to the "unreasonably dangerous" qualifica-
tion per se, but rather to the indicia provided in the commentary to
section 402A for the determination of unreasonable danger. 19 The
Chief Justice believed that instructions based upon the language
of comments g and i could influence a jury to employ the negligence-
oriented "reasonable man" standard and increase the burden of
proof borne by the plaintiff. As he remarked in Berkebile,
[T]he 'reasonable man' standard in any form has no place in a
strict liability case . . . . To charge the jury or permit argu-
ment concerning the reasonableness of a consumer's or seller's
16. - Pa. at -, 337 A.2d at 900.
17. Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903 (1974).
Salvador abolished the horizontal privity requirement of § 2-318 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-318 (1970), in implied war-
ranty actions. See 79 DICK. L. Rav. 539 (1975).
18. - Pa. at -, 337 A.2d at 900 (footnote added).
19. Comment g defines "defective condition" as "a condition not contemplated
by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him." RESTATE-
MENT § 402A, comment g at 351. Comment i explains, "The article sold must
be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community
as to its characteristics." Id. § 402A, comment i at 352.
actions and knowledge, even if merely to define 'defective condi-
tion' undermines the policy consideration [of Salvador] ..... 20
The requirement that a product be in a "defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous to the user,"21 however, does not eliminate the
crucial distinction between strict liability and negligence. It fo-
cuses properly on the condition of the product rather than on the
conduct of the seller or the consumer. Nor does it necessitate
an inquiry into the existence of due care on the part of either party.
The Restatement comments set forth an objective test of unreason-
able danger as viewed from the perspective of an ordinary con-
sumer.2 2  Properly understood, "[t]his formulation focuses on the
product as a functioning entity in the hands of the consumer; it is
totally removed from the negligence approach which emphasizes the
manufacturer's conduct."23 Judge Huyett stated in Beron,
Despite the use of words that in a sense 'ring in negligence,'
careful jury instructions modeled after comments g, h and i of
§ 402A properly focus the jury's attention on the condition of
the product; the conduct of both the seller and the consumer are
made irrelevant. In that sense, then, the essential distinction
between negligence and strict liability is preserved.
24
Unless the jury instruction is carefully worded, however, the jury
may be influenced by the "unreasonable danger" requirement to em-
ploy the "reasonable man" standard. 5 Should this occur, Chief Jus-
tice Jones' concern with the unreasonable danger formulation of sec-
tion 402A would be justified. Nevertheless, section 402A requires
no consideration of the reasonableness of either the consum-
er's or seller's actions or knowledge, but rather a determination of
whether a product's condition meets the expectations of the ordinary
consumer. It thus furnishes what might be termed a "reasonable
product" standard.
20. - Pa. at -, 337 A.2d at 900 (emphasis added). The Berkebile opinion
rejects both the objective test for unreasonable danger set forth in the commentary
to § 402A and the "reasonable seller" test proposed by Professor Wade. Id.
at - n.6, 337 A.2d at 899 n.6; see Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufac-
turers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965). In Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D.
Pa. 1971), the court applied the Wade risk-utility factors in its determination
of unreasonable danger. Chief Justice Jones suggested that these objective tests
"have . . . diluted the strict liability concept" because they are "based upon the neg-
ligence-oriented 'reasonable man' standard." - Pa. at -, 337 A.2d at 899.
21. RESTATEMENT § 402A(1).
22. See note 19 supra.
23. Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, The Technological Expert in Prod-
ucts Liability Litigation, 52 TEXAS L. REv. 1303, 1304 (1974).
24. 402 F. Supp. at 1276 (emphasis in original). An example of carefully
worded jury instructions employing the language of § 402A is contained in note 4
of the Beron decision. Id. at 1271.
25. Cf. Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 602, 304 A.2d 562, 564
(L. Div. 1973). Both Glass and Berkebile quoted Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8
Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972), in which the court disavowed
§ 402A in its entirety because its language "rings of negligence." Id. at 132,
501 P.2d at 1161, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 441.
Recent Cases
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Having voiced its disapproval of the "unreasonably danger-
ous" qualification of section 402A, the Berkebile opinion vaguely
instructed that "[t]he purpose of the 'unreasonably dangerous' clause
would appear to be best served by its inclusion in the issue of proxi-
mate cause."' 26  Chief Justice Jones stated that the preclusionary
purpose of the "unreasonably dangerous" qualification
can be met by requiring proof of a defect . . . . The plaintiff
must still prove that there was a defect in the product and that
defect caused his injury; but if he sustains this burden, he will
have proved that as to him the product was unreasonably dan-
gerous.
27
In so holding, the Chief Justice cited with approval the California
Supreme Court's decision in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.28 Nei-
ther Berkebile nor Cronin, however, gave content to the term "de-
fective. '29  Without an objective standard by which to evaluate
the condition of a product, the jury is left with little more than its
intuitive understanding of product safety requirements. Judge
Huyett remarked in Beron,
By limiting sellers' liability to products sold in a defective condi-
tion unreasonably dangerous to users, the social policy of plac-
ing the burden of accidental injuries caused by products upon
those who market them is given ample protection. . . . No
constructive social policy would be fostered by permitting juries
with an overly broad intuitive understanding of defective condi-
tion to render the seller of a product an insurer against any and
all injuries thereby caused. Likewise the deterrence and com-
pensation functions of § 402A would be subverted if a jury ap-
plied its own lax standards of product safety .... 30
"There must be suitable ways of limiting the [seller's] liability
-both as to its initial existence and as to its scope and extent.'
The scope and extent of liability are properly controlled by the con-
cept of proximate cause, 2 the existence of liability by analyzing the
nature of the product. 3 The lack of an objective standard by which
the nature of a product can be analyzed is critical in design defect
34
cases, in which the alleged defective condition is often difficult to
26. - Pa. at -, 337 A.2d at 899.
27. Id. at -, 337 A.2d at 900.
28. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
29. See Keeton, Products Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 30, 33 (1973).
30. 402 F. Supp. at 1275-76.
31. Wade, supra note 15, at 828.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. A design defect arises when although the product has been manufactured
according to specifications, it is unsafe for its intended use.
evaluate. 5 This is also true in production defect3" cases, although
to a somewhat lesser degree. 7 By failing to furnish an objective al-
ternative to the definition of defectiveness provided by section 402A,
Berkebile's proximate cause formulation tips the balance in favor of
the consumer. If a jury intuitively determines that a product is defec-
tive and that the "defect" was the cause in fact of the plaintiff's in-
jury, the seller may be held liable even though his product's condi-
tion meets society's expectations of product safety. The inherently
subjective proximate cause analysis inadequately safeguards against
this result. Incorporation of the preclusionary function of section
402A into the issue of proximate cause, therefore, fails to clarify the
meaning of the term "defective condition" and heightens the uncer-
tainty about the nature and extent of a seller's potential liability.
The Berkebile opinion, while citing Cronin, did not distinguish
between production and design defect cases. 8 The Cronin court
recognized that "it is easier to see the 'defect' in a single imper-
fectly fashioned product than in an entire line badly conceived,"39 but
held that "a distinction between manufacture and design defects is
not tenable."40 The California court, thus, implicitly acknowledged
that lack of an objective standard may be critical in design defect
cases. Nevertheless, the court chose to discard section 402A, relying
instead on the precedents established in California since Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.41 to give content to the term "de-
35: The facts in Berkebile provide a good illustration of the difficulties facing
a jury required to evaluate an alleged design defect. In Berkebile plaintiff al-
leged, as one of four proposed grounds of recovery, that the rotor system of the heli-
copter in which plaintiff's decedent was killed was defectively designed in that
the average pilot had insufficient time to place the helicopter in autorotation in the
event of an emergency power failure in climbing flight.
Apart from design and production defects, the failure of the seller to give
warnings "required to inform the user. . . of the possible risks and inherent limita-
tions of his product" may also be deemed a defect. - Pa. at -, 337 A.2d at 902.
36. A production or manufacture defect occurs when a product does not meet
the specifications of the manufacturer due to a miscarriage in the manufacturing
process. Wade, supra note 15, at 830. "mhe issue of whether a product is
unreasonably dangerous or unsafe does not generally arise in situations where the
product is clearly in a defective condition because of a mechanical failure in the man-
ufacturing process .... ." Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 352, 357 (1973).
37. "Since all products are flawed at some technological level, the decision
must still be made as to when a flaw emerges as a defect." Weinstein, Twerski, Pieh-
ler & Donaher, Products Liability: An Interaction of Law and Technology, 12 DuQ.
L. REV. 425, 430 (1974).
38. Both the Berkebile and Beron cases involved products alleged to be defec-
tive in design whereas Cronin dealt with a production defect.
39. 8 Cal. 3d at 134, 501 P.2d at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
40. Id. The court suggested that if such a distinction were made, it would then
be more advantageous to characterize a defect in one rather than the other cate-
gory; an injured plaintiff should not have to meet the more difficult "unreasonably
dangerous" standard in design defect cases even though the resultant economic loss
to the manufacturer is much greater when an entire product line is found defective.
41. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
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fect."42  In design defect cases, in which the nature and use of the
products involved vary extensively from one case to the next,4 3
precedent will be of little value to the jury in making its determina-
tion of defectiveness.
The Berkebile opinion neither disavows section 402A in its en-
tirety4" nor expressly excises its "unreasonably dangerous" lan-
guage.15  The clear intent of the Chief Justice, nevertheless,
was to discard both the "unreasonably dangerous" qualification of
section 402A(l) and the objective test provided in the commentary
which requires that the determination of unreasonable danger be
based upon the expectations of the ordinary consumer. As Judge
Huyett pointed out in Beron, "[P]rior to Berkebile no appellate de-
cision of the Pennsylvania courts had intimated any reservations
about the requirement that plaintiffs must prove a defective condi-
tion unreasonably dangerous to the user."' 46  Indeed, "the text and
the comments [of section 402A], including in particular comments
g, h and i, have been solidly engrafted into Pennsylvania law without
reservation."47  Because the rejection of the "unreasonably danger-
ous" qualification represented a drastic and unprecedented action
and because the opinion was signed only by Chief Justice Jones and
Justice Nix,48 Judge Huyett refused to accord it precedential value.49
Certainly the lower courts in applying section 402A should hesitate,
as did Judge Huyett, to infer that a majority of the Supreme Court
42. 8 Cal. 3d at 134 n.16, 501 P.2d at 1162 n.16, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442 n.16.
43. See note 35 supra.
44. Berkebile can be compared with Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d
121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
45. Berkebile can be compared with Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super.
599, 304 A.2d 562 (L. Div. 1973).
46. 402 F. Supp. at 1275, citing Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d
206 (1971); Bartkewich v. Billenger, 432 Pa. 351, 247 A.2d 603 (1968); Webb v.
Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
47. 402 F. Supp. at 1273.
48. Neither Justice Roberts nor Justice Pomeroy addressed the "unreasonably
dangerous" issue in their concurring opinions. Justices Eagen, O'Brien, and Man-
derino simply concurred in the result, agreeing that a new trial should be ordered.
- Pa. at -, 337 A.2d at 903-04.
49. Judge Huyett held that
[wihere, as in Berkebile, an opinion addresses several different issues, and
where no part of the opinion appears to have the approval of a majority,
the opinion reflects only the personal view of its author and is not endowed
with the force of law.
402 F. Supp. at 1277. In support of this conclusion Judge Huyett cited the following
decisions: Bata v. Central-Penn Nat'l Bank, 448 Pa. 355, 293 A.2d 343, cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1108, reh. denied, 410 U.S. 960 (1972); Commonwealth v. Silverman, 422
Pa. 211, 275 A.2d 308 (1971); Commonwealth v. Little, 432 Pa. 256, 248 A.2d 32
(1968).
of Pennsylvania supports the view that Chief Justice Jones expressed
in Berkebile.
The policy of assuring that the seller is treated as the guarantor
of his product's safety can be adequately safeguarded without altera-
tion of section 402A. Carefully worded jury instructions emphasiz-
ing that the condition of the product, not the conduct of the parties,
is to be scrutinized will prevent dilution of strict liability concepts
by negligence principles while properly limiting the seller's liability.
Rejection of the objective definition of defectiveness supplied by sec-
tion 402A without an adequate replacement 50 has introduced un-
necessary confusion into the strict liability law of Pennsylvania.
CRIMINAL LAW-PENNSYLVANIA'S INTOXICATION DEFENSE TO
SPECIFIC INTENT CRIMES EXPLAINED. Commonwealth v.
Graves, - Pa. -, 334 A.2d 661 (1975).
In Commonwealth v. Graves' the Supreme Court of Pennsylvan-
ia formulated a new set of evidentiary rules to elucidate the intoxica-
tion defense in criminal prosecutions. Reversing its stand in Com-
monwealth v. Tarver,2 a divided court3 held that intoxication will
serve as a defense to a specific intent crime4 when it negates an
50. If, in spite of carefully worded jury instructions, the § 402A standard
proves unintelligible to the jury, consideration should be given to the objective risk-
utility analysis proposed by Professor Wade. See Wade, supra note 15, at 837.
[Casenote by John R. Kennel H.]
1. - Pa. -, 334 A.2d 661 (1975).
2. 446 Pa. 233, 284 A.2d 759 (1971).
3. The court divided four to three. Neither Justice Nix, who authored the
opinion, nor Justice Mandarino, who joined with Justices Roberts, Pomeroy, and Nix
in the majority, were members of the Tarver court. This change in court personnel
may have been determinative. Critics of the Graves doctrine are certain to echo
these words of Justice Stewart:
A basic change in the law upon a ground no firmer than a change in
our [the Supreme Court's] membership invites the popular misconception
that this institution is little different from the two political branches of the
Government. No misconception could do more lasting injury to this Court
and to the system of law which it is our abiding mission to serve.
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
4. The term "specific intent" refers to some particular state of mind over and
above that which is presumed from the mere doing of a criminal act. Thus, larceny
requires not only a trespassory taking and carrying away, but also a specific intent
to steal the goods taken and carried away. Some authorities have suggested that the
term be abandoned and the focus be upon whether a crime requires some particular
conscious purpose or knowledge for its commission. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02,
Comments (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
LAW 141-45 (2d ed. 1960).
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element of the crime charged' and that evidence of intoxication will
be relevant to negate an element of a crime when it is directed toward
showing that as a result of drunkenness the defendant did not possess
sufficient mental capacity to attain the state of mind required for the
crime's commission.6 Additionally, it was held that once this evi-
dence is before the fact-finder, the defendant assumes no further
burden of proving his defense. 7  Finally, when a defendant is
charged with first degree murder under the felony-murder rule, evi-
dence of incapacity due to intoxication can serve to negate the under-
lying felony and, thus, show that a felony-murder has not been com-
mitted.'
Following a jury trial Daniel Lee Graves was convicted of
robbery, burglary, and first degree murder under the felony-murder
rule.9 On appeal to the supreme court he assigned as error, inter alia,
the trial court's exclusion of testimony from a forensic psychiatrist
directed at the question whether defendant's intoxicated or drugged
condition allowed him to "'form the specific intent to take or
steal.' "10 Graves also appealed the trial court's refusal to charge the
jury that acquittal was required if they found him incapable of
forming the specific intent necessary to commit robbery because of an
intoxicated or drugged condition." The supreme court ruled for
defendant on both assignments of error, reversed the convictions, and
remanded the case for a new trial.' 2 In so doing the court expressly
overruled its holding in Commonwealth v. Tarver.'8
Tarver had held that gross intoxication rendering a defendant
incapable of forming the specific intent to kill could reduce a murder
5. - Pa. at -, 334 A.2d at 665.
6. Id. at -, 334 A.2d at 663.
7. Id. at -, 334 A.2d at 665.
8. Id. at -, 334 A.2d at 665-66.
9. At the time of Graves' convictions a homicide perpetrated during the com-
mission of a felony (e.g., robbery) was murder of the first degree and all participants
in the underlying felony were rendered guilty of first degree murder, regardless of
their participation in the actual killing. Commonwealth v. Batley, 436 Pa. 377, 260
A.2d 793 (1970); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 410 Pa. 160, 189 A.2d 255 (1963);
Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958); Commonwealth v.
Shawell, 325 Pa. 497, 191 A. 17 (1937). The new Crimes Code, 18 PA. C.S. § 2502,
however, now makes criminal homicide second degree murder when the victim's death
occurs while the defendant is engaged as either a principal or an accomplice in the
commission of a felony.
10. - Pa. at -, 334 A.2d at 662.
11. Id. at-, 334 A.2d at 662.
12. At his new trial on October 7, 1975, a jury returned verdicts of guilty to
charges of first degree murder, robbery, and burglary.
13. 446 Pa. 233, 284 A.2d 759 (1971), overruled, - Pa. at -, 334 A.2d at
665.
charge from first to second degree, 14 but would not alter the basic
nature of that crime. Tarver, furthermore, limited the intoxication
defense to only those crimes the legislature had divided into
degrees-murder for one. Robbery, although requiring a specific
intent, was not included in this category. The supreme court rea-
soned, therefore, that intoxication was not a defense to a felony-
murder charge stemming from a robbery.'
5
The weakness of the Tarver holding was its failure to recognize
that extreme degrees of intoxication can render a person mentally
incapable of forming a specific intent to commit a crime.'" More
importantly, by holding intoxication evidence irrelevant to the issue of
whether a felony-murder had been committed, Tarver ran afoul of the
right of an accused to refute the Commonwealth's case.' 7 Tarver, in
effect, allowed the defendant's drunkenness to supply the specific
intent element, regardless of whether a specific intent was actually
present.
Prior to Tarver no Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decision had
dealt directly with the intoxication defense in a nonmurder context
and only a few had construed its applicability under the felony-
murder rule.'" The superior court and the trial courts, however,
14. 446 Pa. at 239, 284 A.2d at 762. It was probably inaccurate for the court
to speak in terms of reducing the degree of murder. As stated in Commonwealth
v. Jones, 355 Pa. 522, 531-32 n.1, 50 A.2d 317, 322 n.1 (1947) (emphasis in orig-
inal),
The absence of a specific intent to take life does not reduce the crime grade
of a felonious killing from first degree to second degree murder. Rather,
it is the Commonwealth's failure to prove the intent requisite to murder in
the first degree that prevents the crime from being raised from second de-
gree to first degree murder. This distinction is not a mere quibble. Its rec-
ognition is essential to a proper regard for the burden resting upon the
Commonwealth.
15. 446 Pa. at 240, 284 A.2d at 762. Tarver clearly misconstrued the rationale
for allowing the intoxication defense. If the legislature decided to divide all crimes
into degrees, according to Tarver the defense would be available to all criminal de-
fendants. The true basis for the defense, however, is that certain crimes (e.g., lar-
ceny as opposed to battery) require a particular mental state for their commission.
See note 4 supra. Although the court appears to have recognized that robbery is
a specific intent crime, id. at 238 n.3, 284 A.2d at 761 n.3, this distinction was com-
pletely overlooked in its analysis. For an excellent treatment of this and other short-
comings of the Tarver decision, see Note, Intoxication as a Defense to a Criminal
Charge in Pennsylvania-Sequel, 76 DcK. L. REv. 324 (1972).
16. This observation is consonant with current medical knowledge.
Alcohol acts as a depressant and, in large amounts, can seriously interfere
with the drinker's perceptive capacity and mental powers. With 0.30 per-
cent or more of alcohol in the blood (the equivalent of a pint of whisky
in the body) a drinker's sensory perceptions are quite dulled and he has
little comprehension of what he sees, hears, or feels.
Greenberg, Intoxication and Alcoholism: Psychological Factors, 315 THE ANNALS
22, 27 (1958).
17. Commonwealth v. Graves, - Pa. -, 334 A.2d 661 (1975); Common-
wealth v. Jones, 459 Pa. 62, 327 A.2d 10 (1974); Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa.
380, 321 A.2d 880 (1974). The refusal to admit relevant evidence that could raise
a reasonable doubt regarding a defendant's mental capability to form a specific intent
clearly violates this principle.
18. Commonwealth v. Hardy, 423 Pa. 208, 223 A.2d 719 (1966); Common-
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generally had allowed the defense when a specific intent crime was
involved.19 Thus, in stating what it considered to be the settled rule
regarding the intoxication defense in felony-murder cases,2" the Tarv-
er court-with nominal recourse to prior authority of dubious worth2"
-was fashioning a new rule.22  That opinion echoed a fear that
allowance of the intoxication defense would result in a defendant's
complete exoneration from all criminal liability.2" A valid defense
was foreclosed, therefore, merely because the guilty might attempt to
take advantage of it.
The Graves decision, on the other hand, rejected the fear-in-
spired exclusionary rule of Tarver and met the problem by carefully
circumscribing the limits of the defense. The majority in Graves
accepted the intoxication defense to specific intent crimes as a neces-
wealth v. Edwards, 380 Pa. 52, 110 A.2d 216 (1955); Commonwealth v. Simmons,
361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 862, reh. denied, 338 U.S. 888
(1949); Commonwealth v. Wooding, 355 Pa. 555, 50 A.2d 328 (1947); Common-
wealth v. Brooks, 355 Pa. 551, 50 A.2d 325 (1947). The foregoing decisions merely
state the rule that intoxication is no defense to felony-murder; they fail, however,
to provide any rationale for the rule. In fact, only two of these decisions (Common-
wealth v. Simmons, supra, and Commonwealth v. Wooding, supra) were relied upon
by the Tarver court as authority for the rule. In both cases defendants had signed
confessions wherein they admitted commission of the underlying felonies. Moreover,
the evidence of intoxication they introduced was patently insufficient to show inca-
pacity. The facts of both cases probably would have been sufficient to warrant a
conviction of first degree murder independent of the felony-murder rule.
19. The initial appearance of the intoxication defense in a nonmurder context
in Pennsylvania's appellate courts was in Commonwealth v. Ault, 10 Pa. Super. 651
(1899), which recognized the defense to the crime of larceny. Since then the defense
has been recognized in Commonwealth ex rel. Dunbar v. Keenan, 196 Pa. Super. 592,
176 A.2d 135 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 839 (1963) (criminal fraud); Common-
wealth v. Bell, 189 Pa. Super. 389, 150 A.2d 174 (1959) (burglary); Commonwealth
v. Heatter, 177 Pa. Super. 374, 111 A.2d 371 (1955) (assault with intent to commit
rape). In none of these cases, however, did the proffered defense succeed. At pres-
ent, only one Pennsylvania jurisdiction appears to hold that intoxication is not a de-
fense to any specific intent crime. Commonwealth v. Spega, 19 Beav. 11 (Pa. C.P.
1957).
Dean Laub, writing in 1959, stated, "In any case where the specific intent to
commit a crime is an essential ingredient thereof, drunkenness to the point where
such specific intent could not be formed constitutes a valid defense." B. LAUB, PENN-
SYLVANIA TRLI. GUIDE § 195.1(2), at 373 (1959).
20. 446 Pa. at 240, 284 A.2d at 762.
21. See note 18 supra.
22. It has been suggested that Tarver may simply have been attempting to lay
down a broad exclusionary rule, explicitly limiting the applicability of the defense
to murder charges alone. Note, Intoxication as a Defense to a Criminal Charge in
Pennsylvania-Sequel, 76 DICK. L. REV. 324, 329 (1972). This interpretation ap-
pears correct. While two equally compelling reasons for affirming Tarver's convic-
tion existed, the court entirely ignored one and appended the other to its decision
in a makeweight fashion. Id. at 325-26.
23. This same fear is shared by the dissenters in Graves. - Pa. at -, 334
A.2d at 666-67 (Eagen, J., dissenting).
sary one, thereby bringing Pennsylvania into line with most other
jurisdictions. 4 Two broad evidentiary rules formed the basis of their
decision.
The first rule is that all "relevant"25 evidence of intoxication is
admissible to negate the element of specific intent26 and that this
evidence becomes relevant when it tends to establish that the de-
fendant was incapable due to intoxication of attaining the requisite
state of mind.2 7 This rule sharply limits the intoxication defense,28
24. Intoxication is a valid defense to specific intent crimes in over one-half of
the states and in the federal courts. Although recognized, it rarely succeeds.
Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1236, 1246-50 (1966).
25. A leading commentator has said,
mhe most acceptable test of relevancy is the question, does the evidence
offered render the desired inference more probable than it would be without
the evidence? . . .Relevant evidence, then, is evidence that in some degree
advances the inquiry, and thus has probative value, and is prima facie ad-
missible.
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 437-38 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972) (emphasis in
original, citations omitted); see Commonwealth v. Jones, 459 Pa. 62, 66, 327 A.2d
10, 13 (1974); Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 388, 292 A.2d 286, 289
(1972) (quoting the above definition).
26. - Pa. at-, 334 A.2d at 663.
27. Id. at -, 334 A.2d at 663. By clarifying the common-law test of relevancy
as applied to evidence of intoxication, the court has shed light on its probable inter-
pretation of the word "relevant" in § 308 of the Crimes Code, which states that
[i]ntoxication or drugged condition are not, as such, defenses to a
criminal charge; but in any prosecution for any offense, evidence of intoxi-
cation or drugged condition of the defendant may be offered by the defend-
ant whenever it is relevant to negative an element of the offense.
18 PA. C.S. § 308 (emphasis added).
On April 7, 1976, on the other hand, the Governor signed Act 32 into law after
it was passed by margins of 48-0 and 175-0 in the Pennsylvania General Assembly.
This act amends 18 PA. C.S. § 308 to read as follows:
§ 308. Intoxication or drugged condition.
Neither voluntary intoxication nor voluntary drugged condition is a
defense to a criminal charge, nor may evidence of such conditions be
introduced to negative the element of intent of the offense, except that evi-
dence of such intoxication or drugged condition of the defendant may be
offered by the defendant whenever it is relevant to reduce murder from
a higher degree to a lower degree of murder.
The intent of this amendment is to overrule the Graves decision by legislative
action insofar as it allows the defense of intoxication in nonmurder cases. Act 32
may prove to be constitutionally invalid, however, because it restricts a criminal de-
fendant's ability to introduce relevant evidence to refute the Commonwealth's case.
Article I, § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution . . . sets forth the rights
of an accused in criminal prosecutions. Even the most myopic interpreta-
tion of this clause would necessarily concede the right to offer relevant
evidence to challenge a material issue of fact. See Commonwealth v.
Jones, - Pa. -, 327 A.2d 10 (1974).
Commonwealth v. Graves, - Pa. -, - n.7, 334 A.2d 661, 665 n.7 (1975).
Another interesting question posed by this amendment is whether or not it will
,be allowed to operate retroactively. If not, cases arising from incidents prior to its
effective date, April 7, 1976, will be tried under the Graves standard. In all other
nonmurder cases, intoxication will not provide a defense.
28. By circumscribing the limits of the defense to include only those crimes
"[w]here the legislature, in its definition of a crime, has designated a particular state
of mind as a material element of the crime .... ." - Pa. at -, 334 A.2d at 663,
the court clearly has excluded from the permissible reach of the defense the so-called
general intent crimes (e.g., rape, in which the criminal intent is presumed from the
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yet allows an accused considerable latitude to develop his defense.2 0
While emphasizing that "voluntary intoxication neither exonerates
nor excuses criminal conduct," 0 the court acknowledged that a de-
fendant's extreme drunkenness may prevent his commission of a spe-
cific intent crime."' The voluntary act of becoming intoxicated can-
not supply the specific intent element of the crime charged, 2 but
commission of the forbidden acts without requiring further proof of a particular state
of mind). Equally clearly, however, the quoted language demonstrates that the
Graves doctrine is not limited to the crimes of robbery and burglary, but has appli-
cability to all specific intent crimes. This view is in accord with § 308 of the Crimes
Code, 18 PA. C.S. § 308 (quoted, supra note 27), and with the MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.08 (Proposed Off. Draft, 1962), upon which the former is based. When reckless-
ness will suffice to establish culpability, however, intoxication will not be permitted
to negate that element. Id. § 2.08, Comments (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
29. Although the court spoke of a level of intoxication that renders the de-
fendant incapable of forming the requisite intent, certainly this does not mean that
the defendant must actually prove incapacity. See notes 46 and 51 and accompany-
ing text infra. Rather, the test is whether the defendant's evidence of intoxication
renders the inference of incapacity more probable than it would be without such evi-
dence. The defendant may offer any and all evidence that meets this test. See notes
25-26 and accompanying text supra.
When recognized under prior law the intoxication defense was unquestionably
an affirmative one-the defendant had to prove incapacity due to intoxication by a
preponderance of the evidence.
[W]hen the defense is intoxication, the burden is on the defendant to estab-
lish that his intoxication was such as to prevent forming any intent ...
The burden to establish the fact of intoxication is by 'fairly preponderating
evidence.' . . . The same rule applies where the influence of drugs is relied
upon to negative intention.
Commonwealth v. lacobino, 319 Pa. 65, 68, 178 A. 823, 825 (1935) (citations omit-
ted). Evidence of incapacity falling short of the quantum necessary to establish the
defense, however, was deemed relevant at the time of the sentencing to the mental
state of the accused. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 381 Pa. 299, 113 A.2d 274
(1955); Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353, cert. denied, 338
U.S. 862, reh. denied, 338 U.S. 888 (1949).
30. - Pa. at -, 334 A.2d at 663. Professor Perkins stated that although vol-
untary intoxication does not excuse crime, neither does anything else. "Harm may
be excused but not crime. If life has been taken under circumstances amounting to
legally-recognized excuse a careful analysis will disclose that the homicide is excused
and therefore is not a crime." R. PERKINS, CIMINAL LAW 899 (2d ed. 1969) (em-
phasis in original).
31. This means only that the particular crime charged may not have been com-
mitted. A lesser charge requiring only a general intent for its commission can still
provide a basis for conviction. For example, when larceny is charged and the de-
fendant, because of extreme intoxication, was incapable of forming the specific intent
to steal, no conviction on this particular charge can result. The trespassory taking
and carrying away cannot supply the requisite intent to steal. It would, however,
support a conviction on charges of trespass to goods, in which a general intent is
inferred from the commission of a prohibited act. See note 28 supra.
32. When a statute sets forth certain discrete elements as composing a com-
pleted crime, those elements-and those alone-must be controlling in establishing
a conviction. When, for example, a defendant is charged with first degree murder,
the Commonwealth is required to prove the specific mental elements of premeditation
and intent to kill. Commonwealth v. Williams, 455 Pa. 539, 316 A.2d 888 (1974);
the defense is always a partial one.33
To understand the first of the Graves rules one must recognize
that persons who have been drinking ordinarily are capable of enter-
taining a specific intent, 4 but that inordinately gross states of intoxi-
cation can render an individual incapable of entertaining this level of
intent 5 and make it impossible for him to commit a specific intent
crime. Therefore, a defendant who offers evidence demonstrating
merely a state of intoxication has not excluded the possibility that he
formed the specific intent requisite to commission of the crime
charged. On the other hand, evidence tending to show incapacity
due to drunkenness, a fortiori, would tend to disprove the presence of
intent"6 and, thus, would be relevant to negate that element of the
offense.
Having met the issue of relevancy, the court next announced an
evidentiary rule enunciating the burden of proof once the defense of
intoxication is raised.37 Under prior law the intoxication defense was
considered affirmative 38 and as recently as 1970 the supreme court
had reaffirmed the traditional Pennsylvania burden of proof for
affirmative defenses.39 Then, in 1974 something of a bombshell
Commonwealth v. Abeam, 421 Pa. 311, 218 A.2d 561 (1966). If, therefore, a de-
fendant becomes too intoxicated to premeditate or to harbor the specific intent to
kill, he cannot commit first degree murder. Commonwealth v. Ingram, 440 Pa. 239,
270 A.2d 190 (1970); Commonwealth v. Brabham, 433 Pa. 491, 252 A.2d 378
(1969). On the other hand, the voluntary act of becoming grossly intoxicated can
demonstrate recklessness and when recklessness suffices to establish culpability, vol-
untary intoxication can serve as the basis for conviction. See note 28 supra.
33. See notes 28 and 31 supra.
34. This assumption comports fully with common experience: "It is common
knowledge that intoxicated men, although not in normal control of their faculties,
do deliberate . . . and form a particular intent and commit criminal acts as they
might not do if they were sober." People v. Koerber, 244 N.Y. 147, 152, 155 N.E.
79, 82 (1926). Furthermore, it is in accord with medical knowledge: "Drink re-
moves, to a degree, the restraints and inhibitions which impel men to behave like
adult, civilized beings. In this way alcohol 'stimulates.' It does not stimulate by
'stepping on the gas' but rather by paralyzing the brakes." Muelberger, Medico-legal
Aspects of Alcohol Intoxication, 35 MICH. ST. B.J. 36, 40-41 (1956). "An ordinary
drinker's sensory perceptions are seriously affected only after consumption of large
quantities of alcohol; but even then he may be capable of consciously forming the
specific intent necessary for the crime charged." Paulsen, Intoxication as a Defense
to Crime, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 8-9.
35. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
36. Logically, a person who is mentally capable of forming a specific intent
may or may not, in fact, have done so. On the other hand, a person incapable of
forming a specific intent must necessarily be incapable of possessing such intent.
This critical distinction is recognized in 2 W. TRIcKETT, THE LAW OF CRIMES IN
PENNSYLVANIA 738 (1908), in which it is considered with reference to the specific
intent to kill necessary to first degree murder.
37. - Pa. at -, 334 A.2d at 665.
38. Commonwealth v. Barnosky, 436 Pa. 59, 258 A.2d 512 (1969); Common-
wealth v. lacobino, 319 Pa. 65, 178 A. 823 (1935); Commonwealth v. Morrison, 266
Pa. 223, 109 A. 878 (1920); see note 29 supra. See also Comment, Intoxication
as a Defense to a Criminal Charge in Pennsylvania, 76 DICK. L. REv. 15 (1971).
39. Commonwealth v. Winebrenner, 439 Pa. 73, 265 A.2d 108 (1970). Al-
though Winebrenner dealt specifically with self-defense, the court took this opportu-




burst in Pennsylvania jurisprudence with the supreme court's decision
in Commonwealth v. Rose.4" Rose dealt specifically with the intoxi-
cation defense and repudiated Commonwealth v. Winebrenner4 and
prior decisions42 that had placed a burden of proof by a preponder-
ance of the evidence upon any defendant who relied upon one of the
recognized affirmative defenses. Rose held that once some evidence
on the issue of incapacity due to drunkenness is placed before the
trier of fact, the defendant has no further burden of proof. The
prosecution can introduce evidence to refute incapacity, but is under
no duty to do so." The risk of nonpersuasion, however, rests with
the Commonwealth.
45
The Graves court reiterated this view,46 discerning the anomaly
inherent in the old rule. The prosecution had to prove each essential
element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, but the
defendant could be convicted if his evidence of incapacity fell short of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence even though it raised a
reasonable doubt.
It may appear that Graves requires the prosecution, when a
defendant raises the incapacity issue, to prove capacity beyond a
reasonable doubt, thereby adding an additional element to the normal
proof of intent and actus reus.47 This theory, however, cannot with-
A.2d 441 (1959), which had cast considerable doubt on the issue of whether a de-
fendant assumed the burden of proving an affirmative defense. See B. LAu, PENN-
SYLVANIA TRIAL GUIDE § 220, at 124 (Cum. Supp. 1959-69). The Winebrenner court
held that Bonomo applied solely to the defense of alibi, that alibi is not a true affirm-
ative defense, and that the burden of proving it is not properly placed upon the de-
fendant. It was further held, however, that all true affirmative defenses require proof
by a preponderance of the evidence.
Later that same year the court considered yet another of the affirmative de-
fenses, insanity. As evidenced by the four separate opinions and one concurrence
in the result, agreement on the measure of proof necessary to establish this defense
was far from unanimous. The solidarity shown in Winebrenner evidently was
shaken. Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 268 A.2d 89 (1970).
40. 457 Pa. 380, 321 A.2d 880 (1974).
41. 439 Pa. 73, 265 A.2d 108 (1970); see note 39 supra.
42. E.g., Commonwealth v. Johnston, 438 Pa. 485, 263 A.2d 376 (1970); Com-
monwealth v. lacobino, 319 Pa. 65, 178 A. 823 (1935); Commonwealth v. Stein, 305
Pa. 567, 158 A. 563 (1932); Commonwealth v. Troy, 274 Pa. 265, 118 A. 252
(1922); Commonwealth v. Morrison, 266 Pa. 223, 109 A. 878 (1920).
43. "Such evidence may be adduced by the defendant as part of his case, or,
conceivably, may be found in the Commonwealth's own case in chief or be elicited
through cross-examination." Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380, 390, 321 A.2d
880, 884 (1974).
44. Id. at 390, 321 A.2d at 884-85.
45. Id. at 389, 321 A.2d at 884.
46. Commonwealth v. Graves, - Pa. -, -, 334 A.2d 661, 665 (1975).
47. A similar argument was rejected by the supreme court in Commonwealth
v. lacobino, 319 Pa. 65, 178 A. 823 (1935).
stand close analysis. In meeting its standard burden of proof on the
presence of intent, the prosecution necessarily establishes mental ca-
pacity to formulate intent.
48
The complete set of evidentiary rules emerging from Graves,
then, state that intoxication (or drugged condition) will provide a
defense to a specific intent crime when this condition serves to negate
the presence of the particular state of mind required as an element of
the crime charged. To negate this element the defendant can offer
all relevant evidence tending to support the inference that because of
intoxicated or drugged condition he was incapable of achieving this
particular state of mind. 49 The defendant need not elicit this evi-
dence in his own case, but can rely on evidence of incapacity brought
out in the Commonwealth's case in chief or during cross-examina-
tion. 50 Once evidence from any source is before the trier of fact, the
defendant assumes no further burden of proving the defense. Any
evidence introduced in the defendant's case only seeks to discredit the
prosecution's case.51 The prosecution, on the other hand, can seek to
rebut this evidence and its inference of incapacity by producing
evidence of capacity, but it is under no duty to do so. The burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, nevertheless, rests with the prosecu-
tion. If the evidence of incapacity is of sufficient strength to raise a
reasonable doubt about the presence of specific intent, the jury cannot
convict.
52
48. The prosecution is aided by the logical inference that if a defendant is
shown to have possessed the requisite intent in accordance with the prosecution's nor-
mal burden of proof, by necessary implication his capability to possess this intent
is also established. This proposition gains support from the prosecution's lack of
duty to introduce independent evidence to rebut the defendant's evidence of incapac-
ity. See note 44 and accompanying text supra. Problems with affirmatively estab-
lishing capacity never arise, however, unless there is some evidence in the case suf-
ficient to place in issue the defendant's incapacity due to drunkenness. Thus, the
Commonwealth is not put to the task of disproving a negative. Commonwealth v.
Rose, 457 Pa. 380, 389, 321 A.2d 880, 884 (1974).
49. It is crucial that the defendant's evidence of intoxication tend to establish
incapacity and not merely a state of insobriety:
The words 'drunk' and 'intoxicated' as customarily used do not neces-
sarily signify complete mental prostration, and hence the mere fact that a-
alleged burglar was drunk at the time does not negative the possibility of
his having broken in with burglarious intent.
R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 905 (2d ed. 1969).
50. See note 43 supra.
51. The burden now resting upon the defendant (if, in fact, it is denominated
a burden), thus, may properly be termed one of going forward with the evidence as
opposed to the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence formerly im-
posed.
52. The evidentiary pattern prescribed in Graves is substantially similar to that
employed in the federal courts. See, e.g., Goings v. United States, 377 F.2d 753 (8th
Cir. 1967); Womack v. United States, 336 F.2d 959 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Heideman
v. United States, 259 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Allen v. United States, 239 F.2d
172 (6th Cir. 1956); Edwards v. United States, 172 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1949);
United States v. Williams, 332 F. Supp. 1 (D. Md. 1971). Thus, the following jury
instruction, which is patterned after those given in the federal courts when the de-
fense of intoxication is raised, would be proper:




By making capacity the test of relevancy of intoxication evi-
dence,53 the court effectively has isolated those cases in which the
defense should be allowed. Furthermore, by removing the affirma-
tive burden from the defendant, the court has aligned Pennsylvania
law with the fundamental legal tenet that the prosecution in any
criminal proceeding must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and
every element of the crime charged.54
Although Graves considerably altered the intoxication defense
from its previous stance, other recognized defenses, such as mistake, 55
self-defense,56 and duress,57 should be substantively unaffected by the
decision. Intoxication is a defense only to capacity to form a specific
intent; it has no bearing on these collateral defenses. The opinion,
however, does ring the death knell of their affirmative (i.e., proof by
excuse for the commission of a crime, the fact that a person may have been
intoxicated at the time of the commission of a crime may negative the ex-
istence of a specific intent.
So, evidence that a defendant acted or failed to act while in a state
of intoxication is to be considered in determining whether or not the de-
fendant acted, or failed to act, with specific intent, as charged.
If the evidence in the case leaves the jury with a reasonable doubt
whether, because of the degree of his intoxication, the accused was capable
of forming . . . [the] specific intent to commit the crime charged, the jury
should acquit the accused.
The jury will always bear in mind that the law never imposes upon
a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witnesses
or producing any evidence.
1 E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 13.18,
at 298-99 (1970); W. MATHES & E. DEvIrr, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUC-
TIONS § 10.16, at 113 (Supp. 1968). A similar instruction covering the defense of
drugged condition is provided in the above-cited authorities at 1 E. DEvrrr & C.
BLACKMAR, supra, § 13.19, at 300; W. MATHES & E. DEvTr, supra, § 10.17, at 113-
14.
53. See notes 25-27 and accompanying text supra.
54. "It is axiomatic that the presumption of innocence requires the Common-
wealth to prove each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt."
Commonwealth v. Graves, - Pa. -, -, 334 A.2d 661, 665 (1975); see Common-
wealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380, 321 A.2d 880 (1974); Commonwealth v. Bonomo, 396
Pa. 222, 151 A.2d 441 (1959).
55. For mistake of fact to be a defense, the mistake must have been one that
a reasonable man under the same circumstances could have made. 18 PA.C.S. §
304. The standard of reasonableness being an objective one, it should be no defense
that a defendant through intoxication has caused himself to make a mistake that a
sober man would not have made.
56. The defendant must have reasonably believed that he was in imminent
danger. Commonwealth v. Daniels, 451 Pa. 163, 301 A.2d 841 (1973); Common-
wealth v. Pride, 450 Pa. 557, 301 A.2d 582 (1973). If the defendant has engendered
an unreasonable belief through the use of intoxicants, he may not take advantage of
this condition to exculpate himself.
57. The alleged coercive force must be one that would overcome a person of
reasonable firmness. 18 PA.C.S. § 309. An inebriate may be more subject to duress
than a sober man, but the standard, like that in the defense of mistake, is an objective
one and intoxication should afford no special grounds for mitigation or excuse.
a preponderance of the evidence) status. 5 Unaltered is the rule
requiring adequate provocation to reduce an intentional killing from
murder to manslaughter. 59 Similarly, cases holding that intoxication
will provide no defense when the formation of intent preceded drunk-
enness appear unimpeached. 0
Thus, the Graves rules circumscribe the intoxication defense to
include only those crimes that require a specific intent for their
commission. The defense is unavailable for the so-called general
intent crimes. 6' The clear indication of the decision is that voluntary
intoxication," no matter how gross, will not provide a blanket de-
58. Although Graves does not specifically mention other affirmative defenses,
the court's reasoning regarding burden of proof is equally persuasive when applied
to these defenses. It must be emphasized, however, that although the other defenses
(e.g., insanity, mistake of fact, self-defense, etc.) can be complete defenses, the intox-
ication defense is, at most, a partial one. See note 31 supra.
Act of April 7, 1976, P.L. -, No. 32, which is designed only to prevent the
defense of intoxication from operating in nonmurder cases, will not affect this aspect
of the Graves decision. See note 27 supra.
59. Commonwealth v. Graves, - Pa. -, -, 334 A.2d 661, 665 (1975). The
fact of adequate provocation is external to the mind of the defendant; the question
is, therefore, would an ordinary- xiin" hiie been sufficiently provoked to reduce to
manslaughter an unlawful killing that would otherwise be murder? Commonwealth
v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 292 A.2d 286 (1972). A defendant's claim that his pas-
sions were more easily aroused because of his intoxicated state affords no firmer
grounds for defense than those provided by the claim that he would not have commit-
ted the crime had he been of a less pugnacious nature.
60. Prior Pennsylvania cases have held that when the formation of intent pre-
cedes intoxication, intoxication will furnish no defense. Commonwealth v. McMur-
ray, 198 Pa. 51, 47 A. 952 (1901); Goersen v. Commonwealth, 106 Pa. 477 (1884);
Nevling v. Commonwealth, 98 Pa. 322 (1881). Other jurisdictions agree. E.g.,
cases collected at 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 68,-at 219 nn.36-38 (1961). Public pol-
icy mandates this approach.
In view of the penchant of criminals to fortify themselves with liquor and
drugs before launching on a criminal enterprise, public policy or necessity
requires that intoxication by such means should not constitute a defense in
a situation such as [this] .
B. LAUB, PENNSYLVANu TRIAL GUIDE § 195.1 (1), at 372 n.24 (1959).
The Graves opinion noted that the alleged burglary and robbery were carried
out "pursuant to a prior conceived plan." - Pa. at -, 334 A.2d at 662. Under
prior law had Graves been involved in the planning of the crime and later become
intoxicated, this would have constituted clear grounds for affirmance of his convic-
tion. There was no evidence, however, to indicate that Graves had any preconceived
intent. The evidence indicated only that he was present at the scene of the crime
with two codefendants. It is possible that the supreme court ignored the issue of
preconceived intent to reach what they considered the primary issue-prescribing
rules for the intoxication defense. Graves' new trial should have revealed a precon-
ceived intent if one existed. Nothing in this opinion, therefore, indicates that the
rule regarding formation of intent before intoxication has been either altered or aban-
doned.
61. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
62. The term "voluntary intoxication," like the intoxication defense itself, is a
generic one covering both alcoholic and drug-induced stupors. Commonwealth v.
Graves, - Pa. -, 334 A.2d 661 (1975); Commonwealth v. Tarver, 446 Pa. 223,
284 A.2d 759 (1971); Commonwealth v. Iacobino, 319 Pa. 65, 178 A. 823 (1935);
Commonwealth v. Detweiler, 229 Pa. 304, 78 A. 271 (1910); Commonwealth v.
Schuler, 157 Pa. Super. 442,43 A.2d 646 (1945). This judicial practice of treating
the two conditions as one for purposes of the intoxication defense has been codified
in 18 PA.C.S. § 308; see note 27 supra.




fense to all forms of criminal conduct. By allowing the defense to
operate within carefully delineated bounds, the court has attempted to
strike the necessary balance between discouraging voluntary intoxica-
tion and embracing those few defendants who should be availed of it.
Furthermore, by reasserting that intoxication provides no excuse for
criminal conduct, the court has avoided creation of an exculpatory
rule for inebriates.6" The intoxication defense as prescribed in
Graves, therefore, might be viewed as a tool for classifying crimi-
nals, 6 4 culling those few drunken offenders whose lack of conscious
intent mandates that less than the full sanctions of the law be brought
to bear from those whose conscious purpose poses the special dangers
that the more severe penalties are designed to curb.
65
of intoxication evidence apply with equal force to alcohol and drugs, difficulties may
arise when drug-induced intoxication is advanced to negate mental capacity. The ef-
fects of alcohol upon mental capacity are a matter of common knowledge, but the
mentally debilitating effects of drugs are not. Typical of the popular misconceptions
surrounding the effects of drugs is that regarding opiates:
It is a common popular belief that opiates per se . . . directly incite
otherwise normal persons to violent assaultive criminal acts, including sex-
ual crimes. This view is not tenable. Opiates are quieting drugs that re-
press hostile urges, create a passive, dreamy state and depress sexual drives.
On the other hand, the opiates are valuable to criminals in other ways.
They allay anxieties and, therefore, supply a kind of "dutch courage" which
may be valuable to criminals in the commission of certain acts. It is par-
ticularly important to note that this "dutch courage" is achieved without any
great deterioration in mental ability or manual dexterity, such as is induced
by alcohol and other drugs.
COUNCIL ON MENTAL HEALTH, AM. MED. AsS'N, REPORT ON NARCOTIC ADDICTION
24 (1957). Misconceptions about drugs' effect on capacity, coupled with the knowl-
edge that certain drugs have no effect whatsoever upon capacity, mandate that a
court, when passing on the relevancy of drug-intoxication evidence, require a proper
foundation for its introduction. This foundation should demonstrate that the particu-
lar intoxicant in question has the power to render an individual mentally incapable
of forming the requisite specific intent.
63. The law does no more than to hold that it is not an excuse that the
actor might not have committeed the offense had he been sober. The infirm-
ity induced by intoxication offers no stronger basis for the actor's exculpa-
tion than infirmities produced by other causes.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08, Comments at 3 (Tent. Draft. No. 9, 1959).
64. See Murphy, The Defense of Voluntary Intoxication, 9 LAw NOTES 7, 9
n.13 (1972).
65. When considering whether to permit the intoxication defense to operate
against a specific intent crime, it is important to keep in mind that
[miodern orthodox jurisprudence perceives subjective culpability-an ac-
tual, blameworthy state of mind-as the most appropriate basis for criminal
liability. When applied to specific intent crimes, this philosophy would re-
quire the defendant to have a conscious purpose or knowledge. The offend-
er's conduct is probably more dangerous and certainly more reprehensible
and subject to deterrence when he has a conscious intent. . . . The thief
should be punished not so much for meddling with someone else's goods
but because of a conscious intent to steal them.
Id. at 8-9 (footnotes omitted).
[Casenote by R. Burke McLemore, Jr.]

